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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

ST.ATE O.F UTAH

ALFRED ROGER MOORE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
vVESTERN RAILROAD CO~IP ANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 8284

PETITION FOR REHEARING
and
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COMES NOW Alfred Roger Moore, respondent herein, and respectfully petitions this IIonorable Court for
a rehearing in the above-entitled case and to vacate the
Order of the Court herein reversing thP judgment for
respondent.
This petition is based on the following grounds:
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Point I.
This Court erred in holding that the jury should have
been instructed that they were not to take into consideration .any evidence regarding a ruptured disc.
Point II.
The Court erred in ruling that the trial court was in
error when it gave its Instruction No. 12 to the effect
that the statutes of the State of Utah and Colorado cover.
ing Employers' Liability and vV orkman's Compensation
are not applicable and that plaintiff's right to recover is
based solely upon the statutes of the United States.
Point III.
The Court erred in ruling that the trial court was in
error in giving its Instruction No. 13 to the effect that
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act an employee
should not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where his injury resulted in whole
or in p.art from defendant's negligence.
Point I\7 •
The concurring judges erred in holding that the
verdict was excessive indicating bias and prejudice on the
part of the jurors.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for the
respondent, petitioner herein, and that in my opinion
there is good cause to believe the judgment objected to
is erroneous and that the case ought to be re-examined
as prayed for in said petition.
DATED March 31st, 1956.
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

POINT I.
THIS COUR.T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JURY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT :THEY WERE
NOT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ANY EVIDENCE
REGARDING A RUPTURED DISC.

The opinion herein confuses a number of propositions. In the first place, the injury from which plaintiff
suffers was definitely established by the opinion of the
doctor. lie testified that in his opinion plaintiff was
suffering from nerve root irritation as follows (R. 61):

"* * *

it was my opinion th.at 1\Ir. Moore had
irritation of the nerves of the lower spine, which
radiate into both legs, especially on the left side."
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He was asked about the causal relation between the
dropping of the tire and the nerve root injury. He testified that it was possible that the dropping of the tire
caused the nerve root injury. This established that medically there could be .a causal relation between the two.
At this point the claimant in Chief Consolidated Mining
Co. v. Salisb1JJry, 61 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929, stopped. However, in the case at bar, as in Utah Fuel Co. v. Industria~
Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070, plaintiff proceeded with further evidence. In both cases plaintiff and
claimant proved there was no symptom before the
trauma. From the trauma to the time of trial in the case
at bar, and to the time of death in the Utah Fuel case,
the plaintiff and deceased had suffered pain and disability. According to the Utah Fuel case, this was sufficient to make a jury case on causal relation.
It was on this very basis that the court in the Utah
Fuel case distinguished the Salisbury case. In discussing
this latter case, the court stated (p. 30) :
"* * * The case of Chief Consolidated Mining
Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P. 929, 930, is not
necessarily in conflict 'vith this view. While the
decision does not state what the nature of the accident was 'vhich it was clai1ned accelerated a
chronic disease of the heart, the record reveals
that it was a definite event, to wit, a slipping and
wrenching of the muscles of his right side and
a bruising and straining of the muscles of his right
chest wall in trying to stop the fall. The opinion
states that there was 'no positive statement that in
the judgment of the experts testifying it did or
could have (accelerated the heart disease).' "
* * * *
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"* * *

This court in that case went on to say
'nor is there any fact proven from which it might
legally or reasonably be deducted that the accident did accelerate the disease.'
"In this case there are such facts. The specifie member was injured and from that time on
grew progressively vvorse until death."
It is the Utah Fuel case which is similar to the case
at bar .and not the Salisbury case as stated in the opinion.
The case at bar is stronger than the Utah Fuel case because the doctor there said that he would not even speculate whether the injury accelerated the pre-existing cancerous condition and this court paraphrased his testimony
as follows (p. 29):

"* * * The medical profession has been unable definitely to determine the cause and cure of
cancer. The profession is hesitant to make any
positive statements concerning it."
This is very similar to Dr. Clegg's testimony (R. 64):
"A.

In medicine, we cannot come out definitely on
things, very often and say absolutely definitely that such-and-such a condition is so-and-so,
but vve usually qualify our diagnosis, because
sometimes we get fooled, and we use the word
'possible' and that is all I can state. I cannot
say definitely that this is probably or definitely that it is. It is just a possible condition;
that was my opinion."

What was the specific internal condition which
caused plaintiff's nerve root irritation~ No cause or
condition other than a ruptured disc vvas suggested by
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anyone. No one could see inside the body of plaintiff
and so anything suggested would not be a certainty.
Just as Dr. Clegg said, if he could not be definite he
could only say it was a possibility. Everything here was
consistent with the existence of a disc. This is not a c.ase
where there are two possible causes and which is the
cause cannot be determined. Here there was a possibility
of one cause and so far as the record is concerned, no
other.
The situation here is analygous to that encountered
in Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 1J.S. 555, 51 S. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1930) where
it is held a judgment should be affirmed 'vhen the fact
of damage is certain but there is uncertainty as to the
extent. The court stated the rule as follows:
"Nor can we accept the view of that court
that the verdict of the jury, in so far as it included damages for the first item, cannot stand
because it was based upon mere speculation and
conjecture. This characterization of the basis for
the verdict is unwarranted. It is true that there
was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but
there w.as none as to the fact of damage ; and there
is a clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had
sustained some damage and the measure of proof
necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount.
The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages
which are definitely attributable to the wrong and
only uncertain in respect of their amount. * * *"
•

=It:

:t

•
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"As was said by Judge Anderson in his dissenting opinion below, there are many cases in
which damages are allowed where the element of
uncertainty is at least equal to that in the present
case - as, for example, copyright and trade-mark
cases, cases of unfair competition and many cases
of personal injury. * * *"
In the case at bar there can be no question that plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the falling of the tire
and \vheel. Hence, damage is certain and only its extent
uncertain when we construe the evidence as does the
majority of this court .

. A. pparently the majority opinion holds that causal
relation is not a jury question. They cite the Utah Fuel
case to support a statement that evidence of possibility
of cause is .admissible. They fail to consider this case on
the question of sufficiency. The case is not one of admissibility but is one of sufficiency of evidence. The
majority relies upon the Salisbury case. However, a
careful reading of the Utah Fuel case shows that the
court distinguished the Salisbury case and refused to
follow it because of the existence of evidence, which is
present in the case at b.ar. The evidence here is that
plaintiff vvas in good health before the injury and had
never had any trouble with his back. From the time of
injury he has constantly been troubled with his back.
We also submit that this Court has "slavishly" followed the witness' choice of words. It has seized upon
the word "possible", taken it out of context and applied
a strict construction to its meaning. The doctor could
not be absolutely sure of the exact condition existing in-
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side of plaintiff's body. He could not see inside. He
therefore used the word possible. In so many words, he
stated that he used the word not in its ordinary connotation but as creating a concept that if a thing was not
absolutely certain then the only term to be used is possible. That is not the usual meaning of the word but the
witness chose "possible" and explained the meaning he
attached to it. See Dr. Clegg's testimony quoted supra.
The opinion on this point flies in the face and is contrary to the language of the United States Supreme
Court in Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740,
90 L. Ed. 916, quoted on page 30 of Respondent's
Brief herein. Of necessity there must be some speculation
in arriving at a conclusion regarding the inner workings
of the human body.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING 'THAT THE TRIAL
COURT WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT GAVE ITS INSTRUCTION
. NO. 12 TO THE EFFECT 'THAT 'THE STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF UTAH AND COLORADO COVERING EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ARE
NOT APPLI·CABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO
RECOVER IS BASED SOLELY UPON THE STATUTES OF
THE UNITED STA'TES.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO.
13 TO THE EFFECT THAT UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILI'TY ACT AN EMPLOYEE SHOULD NOT
BE HELD TO HAVE ASSUMED THE RISKS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT IN ANY CASE WHERE HIS INJURY RESULTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART FROM DEFENDAN·T'S NEGLIGEN,CE.
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Points II and III can be considered together since
they involve the same principle.
For at le.ast a dozen years and by 1nany trial judges
instructions similar or exactly like Instruction Nos.
12 and 13 have been given in F.E.L.A. cases. These trial
judges have been of the opinion that they serve a useful
purpose in keeping the minds of the jury in the proper
channel in deciding the case and to keep jurors from considering things which should not influence their verdict.
""\Vhy should not the jury know what the law is on
propositions which might cause it to go astray~ These
are not instructions on extr.aneous issues but rather are
they cautionary instructions to guard against erroneous
i1npressions jurors probably have.
This Court gives one reason for not g1v1ng these
instructions as follows:

"* * * It is obvious that an attempt to exclude
all possible considerations from the individual
thinking of the jurors which may influence the
verdict would be an impossible task .and result in
instructions so numerous that the only result could
be complete confusion. * * *"
The simple and obvious ansv1er to this is that the
Court can \Vait until the instructions are so numerous
as to result in complete confusion and then reverse or
hold them improper. In the case at bar, this situation
does not exist. Two instructions can hardly be said to be
numerous or to result in confusion of any kind.
Two instructions were requested by plaintiff whereby
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the jury would be informed correctly of the law, an erroneous impression of which might cause an erroneous result
in the verdict. The trial judge, in his discretion, believed
it proper to inform the jury. The Court now says it was
improper. Upon what grounds~ Extraneous issues and
confusion!
We do hope that this striking down of long given
cautionary or extraneous instructions will not be one
sided and only relate to those instructions which aid
plaintiffs in preventing juries from falling into error.
Similar instructions have been given at the behest
of defendants in F.E.L.A. cases for many years by many
trial judges and even in the case at bar. The jury is usually told that syn1pathy should play no part in the trial
of a lawsuit and .a railroad corporation should be treated
the same as an individual. No one ever contends differently. Such instruction covers no issue in the la\vsuit,
but judges have believed this instruction helpful in keeping the "eye" of the jury "on the ball." But certainly
it falls within the principle of the Moore case and hence
should not be given.
Another defendant's instruction uniformly given is
one that informs the jury that defendant railro.ad companies are not insurers of the safety of their employees
and that there is no liability for accidents. No one ever
contends to the contrary and such are never issues in the
case. As the instructions herein struck down, these instructions are helpful to keep juries in the right channels. These instructions n1ay no longer be given, at le.ast
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if this Court applies with even handed justice the doctrine
novv espoused. 'Vhat is taken from plaintiffs should also
be taken from defendants. Other examples could be given
but this should be sufficient to show the error of this opinIon.
A peculiar thing about this opinion is that the trial
court is told not to give these instructions in a retrial
but so far as we re.ad the opinion, it nowhere holds the
giving of these instructions to be prejudicial or reversible
error. This is a new role for an appellate court.
The federal law is controlling. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Y o~tngstown R. Co., 342 lJ.S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312.
Only one federal case was cited in the briefs herein.
It held an instruction that an employee did not assume
the risk of the negligence of his employer was proper
in an F.E.L.A. c.ase. This authority was· ignored and not
even referred to. See Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Burkett, 192 F. 2d 941 (5 C.C.A. 1951). Other cases were cited
upholding this instruction. This Court, when the matter
was squarely raised, refused to hold the giving of this
instruction improper. Brttner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah
399, 142 P. 2d 649 (1943). This latter case held similarly
on the instruction advising that workmen's compensation
laws were inapplicable.
The only .authorities cited by the Court are the
Bruner case (which is contrary to the present holding),
Parker v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425, and
Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d
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921. The Parker case does not consider an instruction
like either of the two here and in fact held the instruction advising under what circun1stances the driver would
be negligent was properly given. In the Ellis caie, the
court shows a complete misunderstanding of the statutory elimination of assumption of risk. It states that
the statutory elimination only applied to it as a defense
and not as an element in determining nonnegligence of
defendant. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318
U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, the court expressly
refused to follow any such concept and ruled every vestige
of that doctrine to have been abolished. It stated:

"* * * We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from
the .law by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress, by abolishing the defense of assumption of
risk in that statute, did not mean to leave open
the identical defense for the master by changing
its name to 'non-negligence.' * * *"
We submit that this Court has held contrary to all
credible authorities, contrary to its own position heretofore announced in the Bruner case and contrary to the
almost uniform practice of many trial judges for many
years in this jurisdiction. We submit such a holding is
absolutely erroneous and improper and before such
a right about face is perpetrated a rehearing should be
granted. The holding in this case has caused confusion
in the minds of the trial judges faced with the problem
of properly instructing juries and keeping their deliberations within proper bounds.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
POINT IV.
THE CO:NCURRING JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE INDICATING BIAS
AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF 'THE JURORS.
1

Two justices held that a new trial should be granted
upon the grounds that the verdict appears to have been
rendered as a result of passion and prejudice. The other
three justices say nothing on this proposition. It therefore see1ns necessary to address ourselves to this.

vVe submit this holding is erroneous. It seems a bit
difficult to believe the jury w.as influenced by passion
and prejudice vvhen it cut the verdict fifty percent. This
is a strange thing for an inflamed group of citizens to
do. They are inflamed against defendant when they cut
the verdict in half in favor of defendant~
This opinion also hypothesizes that the passion and
prejudice was engendered by taking pictures of plaintiff.
This .act was performed by defendant and introduced
by defendant. How many more times must we try this
already twice tried case confronted each time by this
same testimony. It seems neither right nor just to infer
prejudice and passion from an act of a defendant which
itself introduces. As well grant a new trial where a
defense counsel states an insur.ance company is involved.
This minority opinion does not view the evidence
favorable to plaintiff's case. Plaintiff did not take a leave
of absence to put up his hay, he testified. He went to kill
an elk to feed his family once. He~ taught, once, kids to
box; he danced once ; he entered a calf roping contest
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once. He tried not ag.ain because of his back.
The jury was instructed that the amount prayed for
was not material and correctly so. It is of no help here
that the jury found the damages asked were right. The
figures set forth at page 62 of Respondent's Brief are
reasonable, were reasonably arrived at and are justified
by the evidence.
We submit the verdict was not attributable to passion
or prejudice. The trial judge with his facilities of experience, seeing and hearing plaintiff and other witnesses
did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
In Respondent's Brief is found a complete statement
of the evidence most f.avorable to plaintiff. We will not
again review this evidence. The foregoing considerations
should .eliminate the existence of any passion. If there
is any excessiveness in the verdict this Court can require
a remittitur and prevent the requirement of another and
third trial.
CONCLUSION
We re·spectfully pray that the Court grant a rehearing or affirm or consider the matter of ren1ittitur.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
Co1tnsel for Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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